Timeline of the missing primary radar recordings of Ukraine

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Ukraine air traffic control organization UkSATSE was not able to hand over DSB the raw and processed primary radar recordings of Dnepropetrovsk area control. Dnepropetrovsk air traffic control center was responsible for control of MH17 at July 17 2014.

This blogpost will provide an overview of all info on the primary radar.

June 16, 2014: radarstation Artemovsk which is one of two primary radar stations for Dnepropetrovsk was destroyed by a group of masked men (source

June 25, 2014: Dmytro Babeichuk, the acting general director of the Ukrainian State Air Traffic Services Enterprise (UkSATSE) confirms Artemovsk  been taken out of action in an article dated June 25 2014 (source). DSB failed to mention that fact in the final report.

July 17, 2014: MH17 is shot down. The air traffic controller at Dnepropetrovsk ask his Russian collegue at Rostov is he sees MH17 on primary radar. This confirms Dnepropetrovsk did not have primary radar available.

A second radar station in  Tsjoegoejev was in maintenance according a statement made by the Ukraine ambassador to the Netherlands made at February 3, 2016 (source).

July 23, 2014: Ukraine hands over secondary raw and processed radar recordings to the DSB

September 9, 2014: DSB released the preliminary report. It states that DSB received primary radar recorded by Russian radar.

preliminary-radat

End of March 2015: a special envoy of the DSB travels to the Ukraine in an ultimate try to obtain radar recordings. According to Minister Koenders the name of this diplomat is Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged (source)

Dutch newspaper AD reports on February 6, 2016 that according the Ukraine ministry of Transport after January 2015 no talks were done with DSB on radar recordings! (source)

Er is geen Nederlandse diplomaat in maart naar Oekraïne gegaan, misschien is er sprake van een misverstand. Ik denk dat er gesproken wordt over een oud-diplomaat, de heer Jacobovits. Hij deed op persoonlijke titel faciliterend werk voor de OVV. De kern daarvan is dat de contacten van de OVV onafhankelijk zijn. Uiteraard faciliteert het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken dat. Het is onze rol om ervoor te zorgen dat iemand weet waar hij heen moet gaan en dat er gesprekken tot stand komen. Maar de betreffende diplomaat heeft dit juist vanwege die onafhankelijkheid gedaan.

bezoek-eindmaart

October 13, 2o15. DSB presents final report. Mentions primary radar recordings are not available because of maintenance.

December 14, 2015 Member of Parliament Omtzigt asks questions on the missing radar recordings

December 15, 2015. Omtzigt submits a motion to force Dutch government to request radar data. PM Rutte discourages the motion

December 17 , 215 . The ruling parties PvdA and VVD rejected a vote filed by CDA member Pieter Omtzigt to have the Dutch government via the EU request both Ukraine and Russia to hand over radar recordings.

January 12 2016:  member of parliament Pieter Omtzigt requested to ask oral questions to the Dutch government on the missing radar recordings of both Ukraine and Russia. However the request was not granted by the chairwomen of the dutch parliament. (source: Tweet of Pieter Omtzigt). Omtzigt will now request a debate about the radar recordings. VVD and PvdA initially disagree to have a debat on the missing radar recordings. (Tweet Omtzigt). Later both VVD and PvdA agreed to have a seperate meeting on radar images.

January 20 2016: The Dutch government did not do anything to obtain radar images by filing a complain at ICAO. Dutch newspaper Telegraaf reports

January 21, 2016. In a letter to the Parliament, minister van der Steur states the prosecutor does not need additional, primary radar recordings (source)

January 22, 2o16. The Dutch Parliament has a public hearing of experts. A radar expert explains three radar stations must have been able to detect MH17. According to the expert it is extremely unlikely all three were in maintenance at July 17, 2014. (source)

February 2, 2016: Eurcontrol confirms it never received a notification of Ukraine that radar stations were not operational (source)

February 3, 2016 : a former secretary of state of Ukraine told Dutch journalists on an US embassy organized press trip that Ukraine never received a request by DSB to hand over radar recordings (source)

February 3, 2016 : the Ukraine ambassador to the Netherlands tells RTL Nieuws that DSB did request for radar recordings (source). According to the ambassador it was all a “misunderstanding”

February 4 2016. During a plenary debate on the missing radar recordings in Dutch parliament,  Pieter Omtzigt submitted a new motion. He requests government to contact Russia, Ukraine, VS and NATO and ask for radar recordings. Voting on the motion will be on Tuesday 9 February. VVD and PvdA will likely not support the motion.

February 4 2016. Minister van der Steur tells in the debate that the Dutch prosecutor told that the prosecutor (OM/JIT) does not need any additional radar recordings. Van der Steur does not know the date this was said. There is no written and signed letter which confirms the statement of the OM.

February 6, 2016. Dutch newspaper AD reports that Ukraine Ministry of Transport confirms in a written statement that since January 2015 there were no talks with DSB about radar recordings. DSB writes in the final report that in March 2015 a special envoy went to the Ukraine to do an ultimate try to get radar recordings. (source)

Update:

January 10, 2019. I posted a new blogpost about radar. A previously not mentioned military primary radarsystem in use to protect Ukraine airspace was operational at July 17, 2014.

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51 Comments on Timeline of the missing primary radar recordings of Ukraine

  1. One remark: It might have been that the air traffic controller in Dnepropetrovsk asked her colleague in Rostov about MH17 because she was confused as the plane was falling apart, she could not believe her eyes, perhaps thought that something wrong with her instruments…

    • No. I am 100% UkSATSE accepted aircraft at July 17 with no primary radar available in eastern Ukraine. Maybe even before July 17.
      How is that possible? A war situation, military aircaft are operating below civil aircraft and UkSATSE does not have a clue about what is going on.
      It is criminal!

  2. If you have no primary radar available but you can split civil and military aviation in altitude below and above 9700 meter, then they cannot collide and you need no primary radar. May be that was the real reason for that absurd measure and that’s why it had nothing to do with SAM.

  3. Now, if a military plane (AN-26) just flew below MH17 on the same track UkSATSE could not warn MH17 since they could not track their own military planes. The horrible dilemma is UkSATSE had no primary radar (AN-26), and the separatists definitely did not use Flightradar (MH17). So this is Russian roulette.

    The fault in this scenario is no military plane was visible on Rostov radar. But we trust nobody and certainly no video radar images. But to be fair if a military plane was on the same track the Russians surely would have shown.

    But not reality is important but the possible misunderstandings from this tragic situation we are just going to grasp.So we must think better and further.

    • We start thinking again and the Ukrainians had no primary radar from the airports left. But in any case they had their [BUK TAR radar car with a full-function identification FRIEND-OR FOE (IFF) and NON-COOPERATIVE SYSTEM TARGET RECOGNITION (NCTR) modes (motor resonances)].

      So they easily replaced primary radar with complete BUK batteries throughout Luhansk and Donetsk. They made a network of primary radars in the field.

      But that was a very dangerous solution, for just as with the separatists, standalone BUK-TELARS are not developed to detect civil aviation. They are really dangerous and civil aircraft easily are seen as enemy aircraft. So what could have happened?

      A solitary BUK-TELAR of the Ukrainians was in the field and perceived a Russian fighter jet; any case an unknown enemy plane.

      [- To decide what to do without panicking, does require the seclusion of a BUK TAR radar car with “a full-function identification FRIEND-OR FOE (IFF) and NON-COOPERATIVE SYSTEM TARGET RECOGNITION (NCTR) modes (motor resonances). And so on all what BUK-TELARS do not have. At least, the BUK TELAR has but very limited IFF / NCTR capability, in which it perceives the MH17 as enemy aircraft!]

      Now we have construed a logical basis for Ukrainian BUK-batteries in Donetsk even if they did not fear Russian fighter aircraft. It just was to control their own military aviation.

      But at some moment an inexperienced crew member of a BUK-TELAR made a disastrous error. Though he knew there were no Russians in the air in a moment of insanity he saw MH17 for an enemy aircraft.

      No we are there again, since for a Ukrainian crew the same rules apply as for a separatist crew.

      • > So they easily replaced primary radar with complete BUK batteries

        I don’t think this can be done easily. Military hardware is a completely different world with its own protocols. Unless you want to place a man with a telephone in the loop, exchanging information between military an civil apparatus is probably very hard.

        • Maybe indeed communication among all those BUKs in the field was completely independent and different from civil aviation. That just was the problem. Only military commands from air bases as Dnipropetrovsk were important. They just might have thought to be completely independent from civil aviation with their BUK system. They must have erased civil aviation from their minds to above 9700 meters.

          • For Ukraine there never seems to have been a realistic link between admitted fly height for civil aviation and the danger of shooting down a passenger plane.

            Already at June 18, 2014 (Elena Kolenkina) they could have inferred separatists must have SAM which goes much higher than 3.5 km, maybe Pantsirs which go to 15 km height.

            Instead of the safety of civil aviation, there could have been a link with radar stations? Did they first have to install a network of BUK primary radars?

            June 16, 2014: radarstation Artemovsk which is one of two primary radar stations for Dnepropetrovsk was destroyed by a group of masked men (source).

            http://www.buran.ru/htm/mh17_4.htm

            On 1 July 2014 the Ukrainian authorities closed the airspace over the zone of conflict for civil aviation to an altitude of 7900 meters (train FL260, ie 26,000 feet), and from July 8, represented by the Ministry of Transport Ukraine closed the airspace in the area of ​​combat operations for civil aircraft. (…) But the transit of “foreigners” remained above FL 260, and they continued to fly! Pravda, July 14, after the destruction of the An-26 at an altitude of 6000 … 6500 m, the height of a comprehensive ban has been lifted to a height of 9800 meters (32000 feet).

            Did Ukraine simply split its airspace into primary BUK radar below and secondary radar above some height? They definitely did not bother about the safety of air passengers.

            OVERVIEW OF AIRCRAFT LOSSES BY HOSTILE FIRE, ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE.
            (compiled by Airheadsfly.com based on official sources).

            2014.??.??: 2 Su-25s, 2 Mi-24s and 1 Mi-8 in separate incidents.
            2014.08.29: Su-25, over Donbas, likely SAM.
            2014.08.17: MiG-29, over Luhansk, likely SAM.
            2014.08.07: Mi-8, eastern Ukraine, weapon unknown.
            2014.08.07: MiG-29, near Zhdanivka (Donetsk region), by SAM.
            2014.07.23: 2 Su-25, Ukrainian Air Force, near Dmytrivka (Donetsk region), by SAM while providing CAS.

            July 17, 2014: MH17 is shot down. The air traffic controller at Dnepropetrovsk asks his Russian colleague at Rostov id he sees MH17 on primary radar. This confirms Dnepropetrovsk did not have primary radar available.

            2014.07.16: SU-25, Ukrainian Air Force, near Amvrosiyivka / Russian border, hit in tailsection. Second Su-25 hit as well, made successful emergency landing.
            Pravda, July 14, after the destruction of the An-26 at an altitude of 6000 … 6500 m, the height of a comprehensive ban has been lifted to a height of 9800 meters (32000 feet).
            2014.07.14: AN-26, Ukrainian Air Force, near Izvaryne, by SAM.

            On 1 July 2014 the Ukrainian authorities closed the airspace over the zone of conflict for civil aviation to an altitude of 7900 meters (train FL260, ie 26,000 feet) and from July 8, represented by the Ministry of Transport Ukraine closed the airspace in the area of ​​combat operations for civil aircraft. (…) But the transit of “foreigners” remained above FL 260, and they continued to fly!

            Instead of the safety of civil aviation, there could have been a link with radar stations? Did they first have to install a network of BUK primary radars?

            June 25, 2014: Dmytro Babeichuk, the acting general director of the Ukrainian State Air Traffic Services Enterprise (UkSATSE) confirms Artemovsk been taken out of action in an article dated June 25 2014 (source). DSB failed to mention that fact in the final report.

            2014.06.24: Mi-8, near Slovyansk, by MANPADS or AA / heavy-calibre gun.

            Elena Kolenkina video:
            https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gENJhZwfEfc&list=LLZ3GTMiT5A5cyMntaf6Nh6w&index=4

            – But suppose the separatists only had Manpads to 3.5 km at their disposal while airliners flew about 10 km altitude. Then they had no story and no reason to put this video on YouTube. This means separatists already on June 18th IMPLICITLY ADMITTED the possession of Pantsirs, the little brother of the BUK with an altitude range of 15 km.

            June 16, 2014: radarstation Artemovsk which is one of two primary radar stations for Dnepropetrovsk was destroyed by a group of masked men (source).

            2014.06.14: IL-76, Ukrainian Air Force, upon landing at Luhansk Airport, by anti-aircraft fire.
            2014.06.06: AN-30B, Ukrainian Air Force, near Slovyansk, by MANPADS.
            2014.05.29: Mi-8, Ukrainian Army Guard, near Slovyansk, by MANPADS.
            2014.05.05: Mi-24, Ukrainian Army Avation, near Slovyansk, by heavy-machine gun fire.
            2014.05.02: 2 Mi-24s, Ukrainian Army Aviation, near Slovyanks, by MANPADS.
            2014.04.25: Mi-8, Ukrainain Army Aviation, at Kramatorsk Airbase, by (rocket-propelled?) grenade.

          • ESPIONAGE BY CRACKED BUK COMMUNICATION

            Step 1: Separatists discovered Ukrainian army had no control over fighter aircraft without primary radar.

            Step 2: Separatists sabotaged primary radars of airbases.

            Step 3: Ukraine more and more had to separate civil aviation (high alt) from military aviation (low alt) since they could not track any longer their military aircraft and wanted to prevent collisions with civil aircraft.

            Step 4: Of course Ukrainian army detected a series of BUK Target Acquisition Radars (TAR) could replace primary radars in Luhansk and Donetsk.

            Step 5: Since the reach of TAR radar is about 140 km, they were placed with intervals of 140 km in a straight line from the military airport of Dnepropetrovsk into the direction of the stronghold in Donetsk, (South East of Snizhne). The first TAR was placed 70 km from Dnepropetrovsk to the east, the second 210 km further, etc.

            – They were placed in a straight line so fighter jets came over the radial center of the radars and it looked like normal primary radar from the airbase.

            Step 6: Separatists – in cooperation with the Russians – quickly discovered just a single (even mechanically faulty) BUK-TELAR suffices to break into a BUK-missile communication system. They managed to interfere in the internal communication of the Ukrainians without discovery .

            Step 7: This way they noticed when SU-25s were approaching from the base and just in time they switched on their BUK-TELAR Radar and shot down fighter jets.

            Step 8: As said in July 14 the Ukrainian army had a stronghold in the south east of Snizhne on which separatists brought a BUK-TELAR into that direction.

            Step 9: But separatists did not know they meanwhile were discovered and Ukraine had set a trap. Over their BUK system they communicated this trick: an AN-26 was on its way to the stronghold below Snizhne to bring materials.

            Step 9: Separatist waited and just in time they shot down MH17.

          • Variation:

            Step 6: Separatists – in cooperation with the Russians – quickly discovered how to break into a BUK-missile communication system. They managed to interfere with the internal communication of the Ukrainians without discovery.

            Step 7: This way they noticed when SU-25s were approaching from the base and they shot down fighter jets with MANPADS or Pantsirs.

          • Variation:

            Step 9: But separatists did not know they meanwhile were discovered and Ukraine shot down MH17 shortly after the BUK of the separatists arrived in the south of Snizhne.

          • Note, what has changed fundamentally since February 4, 2016.

            We now definitely know the Ukrainians had no primary radar left at the downing of MH17. To continue their flights above Donetsk and Luhansk they desperately needed other kinds of primary radar and they only had BUK TARs left.

            Separatists understood this situation and with help of the Russians they simply succeeded in cracking the codes of BUK systems, if needed, but probably they only had to be in the neighbourhood of the TARs and on the right radio frequency.

            This way they were warned when military planes were coming, since TAR warned the whole system. If TAR was solitary they somehow intercepted the message from the air base. Then they shot military aircraft with MANPADS or Pantsirs.

            If they used BUKs this was much later for this would be easily detected by the Ukrainians.

            This new information is of fundamental interest because we now know definitely what way eventual spying must have gone.

            Note no spotters were needed any longer and remember July 18th the SBU communicated at YouTube separatists had no spotters on July 17.

            As we now definitely know there is a big likelihood Ukraine is somehow involved in the downing of MH17 be it wittingly or unwittingly.

          • Prosto Tak // February 8, 2016 at 10:27 am //

            Basic, you forgot to mention the aliens in your ‘Buk’-cracking scheme engineered to put the blame on the Ukrainians by any price and against all odds and based on “ifs” and “whens” only. Such an addition would give your multi-level conditional scheme more credibility.

          • Prosto:

            I am not vindictive to Ukrainians but separatists have no motive to shoot down MH17. Ukraine is the only country with a motive. So most of my scenarios start with a false flag from Ukraine (a) and let the separatists do the job (b). This is the shortest and most promising permutation with the biggest total chance of success.

          • The scenario can be simplified a lot:

            Step 1: Separatists discovered the Ukrainian army had no control over fighter aircraft without primary radar.

            Step 2: Separatists sabotaged primary radar of airbases.

            Step 3: Ukraine more and more had to separate civil aviation (high alt) from military aviation (low alt) since they could not track their military aircraft any longer and wanted to prevent collisions with civil aircraft.

            Step 4: Ukrainian army replaced primary radars from the airbases with some BUK Target Acquisition Radars (TAR) in the field.

            Step 5: This TAR, or better the BUK COMMAND VEHICLE communicated with the airbase. This communication contained all information about overflying military planes. The airbase informed about coming planes, on which TAR controlled the flight and the BUK COMMAND VEHICLE reported back to the airbase.

            Step 6: I doubt the BUK system works with encrypted information between BUKs, because that would easily lead to mistakes. So separatists probably could intercept normal communication among BUKs on a distance of several kilometers.

            Step 7: Communication from and to the airbase might be encrypted though I bet Ukraine never had experience with this situation before and they possibly still use the telephone for normal communication. Anyway the problem of spying has been reduced to decoding encrypted information at worst. This must be no problem for the Russians.

            Step 8: We skip step 6, because step 7 gives direct information from the airbase. Also in step 7 separatists are not needed in the neighbourhood of any BUK system.

            Step 9: This way separatists noticed when SU-25s approached from the airbase and shot down fighter jets with MANPADS, Pantsirs or BUKs.

            Step 10: In this scenario separatists did not know their spying meanwhile was discovered by Ukraine. Now the airbase communicated a trick: an AN-26 was on its way to the stronghold below Snizhne bringing materials.

            Step 11: Then separatists shot down MH17.

          • Antidyatel // February 9, 2016 at 2:11 am //

            Prosto, I’m sure you don’t assume yourself an info-warrior. You are white and fluffy. But you still fail to ask where were all the grenades (Buks) given to monkeys (Ukrs) in ATO zone. Why was it difficult for Ukrs to give the whole list with dislocations of Buks and Buks missiles in July? Is it because Russians have the whole list with serial numbers for less than 1000 missiles? Audit of those missiles would take a week maximum. No need to throw feaces, Ukraine had such a good chance to stop any talk of possible culpability of Ukr army, but you don’t like simple methods.

          • Prosto:

            The downing of MH17 definitely was no mistake. IMO it has been a premeditated and intentional war crime (mass murder on civilians).

            The downing of MH17 was no accident. In the first place Ukraine is extremely guilty of dolus eventualis what refers to where a perpetrator foresees indirect consequences as a possibility: Awareness of the likely outcome of an action.

            Ukraine is extremely guilty of immoral behavior not to have closed its airspace for civil aviation. This is pure inciting war crime since Ukraine must have foreseen mass murder on air passengers.

            But there is more. I do not believe the separatists had the intention to shoot down a passenger airplane. So in this case war crime cannot be proven.

            Also I do not believe someone pressed the wrong button. Also I believe separatists and Russians had no motive.

            But maybe separatists effectively were the perpetrators. If separatists downed MH17 and also had the intention to shoot down a plane they very likely are premeditated and intentional mass murderers of Ukrainian military’s. And it does not matter that it later turned out to be air passengers. So, if they had no intention to shoot a passenger plane than it will not be war crime but mass murder.

            But separatists and Russians are definitely guilty of the incitement of war crimes if they brought Pantsirs and/or BUKs into Ukraine, just because of dolus eventualis. They must have expect to kill air passengers (Elena Kolenkina).

            Ukraine is the only country with a motive but it is off topic to explain here further.

            [“it’s difficult to find a black cat in a dark room, especially when it’s not there.” ]

            Well, I see a big elephant in the room, which you apparently have missed.

      • Basic, your engineering exercise in basis construction is rather illogical.

        Many civilian planes flew over the Donbas that day, so why “a solitary BUK-TELAR of the Ukrainians in the field” would not “perceive a Russian fighter jet or an unknown enemy plane” earlier in the day and, moreover, would not check it with their command? They would have all the possibilities for that.

        And don’t forget MH17 flew from the Dnipropetrovsk area and thus could not be a Russian jet or enemy plane still undetected by other Ukrainian air defense units.

        As for “a moment of insanity,” you need the whole crew to take aim and fire, it’s not just one man quickly pressing the “red button.”

        On the other side, the separatists/Russians did not need any special logical constructions for their actions.

        They were known to be expecting a Ukrainian military transport plane flying about the same route MH17 did, and they were in a hurry and had no one to consult (if they did not have a contact with a possible Russian TAR on the Russian side of the border, but that is far not sure and most possibly not so).

        • Liane Theuer // February 7, 2016 at 11:23 am // Reply

          That´s the first time I agree with you, Prosto.

          Basic, if there would have been a Buk-net for that purpose they would have the order “don´t shoot in any case”. Above 10 000 m it could have been a civilian airplane an below it could have been an ukrainian military plane.

          IF Ukraine shot down MH17 it must have been an unit completly out of order of the official military command scheme.
          And in this case it was intentionally to receive special goals.

          • Liane, I do not agree. Above 10 000 meters it could have been a civilian airplane, but what to do with a possibly military plane just around 10 000 meters? MH17 flew at FL330 (10 058.40 m).

            I would not take for granted Ukrainian BUK-TELARs always were in full convoy. A solitary BUK-TELAR does not have altitude estimation and easily could have recognized MH17 as an enemy plane.

            Also I am not convinced of the qualities of BUK-TAR radar cars. And I am totally not convinced of the discipline in the Ukrainian army. To say nothing of the possibility they shot down MH17 deliberately.

            mvdb (Marcel) January 27, 2015. At 13:16. the flight plan filed for MH17 signaled at FL330 would be flown over Poland. Only above central Ukraine MH17 would climb to FL350 according plan. Dnipropetrovs’k traffic also asked MH17 whether they wanted to climb to FL350 according to flight plan. The pilot of MH17 has rejected this offer. There is no ambiguity. MH17 has not deviated from flight altitude and certainly is not requested by ATC to descend.

            mvdb January 27, 2015 at 15:58 For completeness the flight plan of MH17. Where F330 state means that flight level 330 (33,000 feet) has been requested. PEKIT is a waypoint and there MH17 would go to FL350. PEKIT located in central Ukraine.

            http://opennav.com/waypoint/UA/PEKIT
            (FPL-MAS17-IS
            -B772/H-SDFGHIJ3J5M1RWXY/LB1D1
            -EHAM1000
            -N0490F310 ARNEM UL620 SUVOX UZ713 OSN UL980 MOBSA DCT POVEL DCT SUI L980 UTOLU/N0490F330 L980 LDZ M70 BEMBI L980 PEKIT/N0480F350 L980 TAMAK/N0480F350 A87 TIROM/N0490F350 A87 MAMED B449 RANAH L750 ZB G201 BI DCT MURLI DCT TIGER/N0490F370 L333 KKJ L759 PUT R325 VIH A464 DAKUS DCT
            -WMKK1137 WMSA WMKP
            -EET/EDGG0017 EDWW0023 EDUU0036 EPWW0052 UKLV0135 UKBV0153 UKDV0225 URRV0255 UATT0347 UTAK0411 UTAA0432 UTAV0507 OAKX0518 OPLR0601 OPKR0616 VIDF0631 VABF0725 VECF0747 VYYF0926 VOMF0930 VTBB1013 WMFC1051 REG/9MMRD PBN/A1B1C1D1L1O1S2 SEL/QREJ DOF/140717 RMK/ACASII EQUIPPED)

            Anyway, MH17 remained hanging at 10 km near the border of death of 9700 meters. Immediately the ATC should have leaded this low flying MH17 around Donetsk instead of letting her fly directly over the BUK because of surrounding aircraft. As we all know the SBU extensively confessed to be known with the position of the BUK of the separatists.

            [If Ukraine shot down MH17 it must have been a unit completely out of order of the official military command scheme.]

            This is a possibility.

        • [Basic, your engineering exercise in basis construction is rather illogical.]

          At the end I only completed this scenario in one of many possibilities. And I considered your critique before. But at this moment I do not attach to how the Ukrainians would have shot down a passenger plane. Maybe they shot MH17 purposely, I don’t know but you forgot to comment on the earlier step which really is important:

          – Does it make sense Ukraine was not bothered by the safety of air passengers but simply separated their airspace into secondary radar above 9700 meters and primary BUK-net radar below. That’s the question that really matters. How MH17 was shot down by Ukrainians is one step too far at this moment.

  4. Liane Theuer // February 7, 2016 at 11:40 am // Reply

    [ Radarstation Artemovsk which is one of two primary radar stations for Dnepropetrovsk was destroyed by a group of masked men.
    A second radar station in Tsjoegoejev was in maintenance.
    A radar expert explains three radar stations must have been able to detect MH17. ]

    Which was the third radar ? And what do we know about it ?

  5. Liane Theuer // February 7, 2016 at 12:14 pm // Reply

    I found the answer :
    “EUROCONTROL zei: Oekraïne heeft ons niks gemeld. Maar de ambassadeur zegt dat Artemivsk en Donetsk kapot waren, Dnipropetrovsk lag te ver en Tsjoegoejev was in onderhoud. Ja, dat zijn dus vier radarstations.
    En hoe zit het met de Oekraïense militaire radar?
    Google Translation :
    Eurocontrol said Ukraine has notified us nothing. But the ambassador said Artemivsk and Donetsk were broken, Dnipropetrovsk was too far and Tsjoegoejev was in maintenance. Yes, that’s four radar stations.
    And what about the Ukrainian military radar ?”
    http://degrijzeduif.blogspot.de/2016/02/tk-debat-radargegevens-mh17.html

    But can we be sure about Donetsk ? On July 17 Donetsk airport was under control of Ukraine. The Tower was not damaged at that time !
    So we need a verification that Donetsk Primary Radar was out of order.

  6. Legally, possibly for Ukraine there was no need to alert Eurocontrol when their primary radars one by one dropped out. Together with the different altitudes above and below 9700 meters, only there could be problems if civil airliners had to dive in case of decompression etc. This was a very low chance.

    Also Ukraine did not need to deliver primary radar data to DSB, for they really had no data left from their ruined radar stations, and furthermore BUK-TAR radar cars possibly do not save data in full. So they theoretically registered the downing of MH17 correctly but had no primary radar data left, which does not mean they did not cover their airspace sufficiently with primary radar. So they needed not inform Eurocontrol.

    They might have misled DSB successfully. So, legally Ukraine easily comes away with this brilliant move. They were obliged to keep these data, what technically might have been impossible, so only a reprimand will result under civil war conditions.

    Now, meanwhile everybody knows except we, the public and the Dutch Parliament. So DSB, JIT and the government keep their mouth shut, since Ukraine has vetoed over what comes into the DSB report and it possibly suites JIT very good only having to deal with American satellite images to hang the separatists.

  7. Liane Theuer // February 8, 2016 at 3:05 pm // Reply

    By the way : What about the radar images anonymously emailed to survivors foundation ?
    Nobody asked about that anymore.

    • No information yet.

      Survivors of MH17 victims have established a Working Group on Establishing the truth. Which is investigating the crash of the aircraft with critical eye, the AD reports. The working group will continue to exert pressure, ” as long as the true facts about the disaster have not yet surfaced,” says member Thomas Schansman.

      We will not obstruct the investigation, but where necessary we will push. “The group is supported by renowned jurists and was founded in the week in which the debate was at its fiercest missing radar images. The people behind the group are dissatisfied with the Dutch search for the facts.

      The working group has been established for the Foundation Vliegramp MH17, where relatives of 183 victims have united.

      http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/25156120/__Nabestaanden_MH17_zitten_overheid_achter_vodden__.html

      • Thomas Schansman // February 9, 2016 at 8:38 am // Reply

        A small correction: we are in the process of establishing this Working Group and approaching other families to help us. The Foundation (Stichting Vliegramp MH17) has a board of advisors among which two legal experts (Arno Akkermans en Theo de Roos).

        • Liane Theuer // February 9, 2016 at 10:42 am // Reply

          Thomas Schansman, nice to see you on board.
          Would you answer the question why the Foundation does not publish the anonymous radar pictures ?
          The Ukrainians leaked x-rays, fragments and pictures of the reconstruction, who came from the highest level. Kiev does not give a damn about confidentiality.
          Why let you miss a muzzle ? Are truth and justice not higher values than political considerations ?

  8. Just an observation.

    Ukraine has admitted having the BUK KUPOL unit of the 156th Regiment, 3rd Battalion in service in Kharkiv Oblast, presumably near ATO command at Izyum. It also had at least one ST-68UM field radar in use. Additionally, the military radar at 156th Air Defense Regiment, 2nd Battalion base A-1659 in Mariupol is not known to have been sabotaged, nor were local radar facilities at Mariupol airport. Finally, the local radar at Kramatorsk Military Air Field had to be functional to support ongoing flights to/from there.

    These facilities were close enough and sufficient to see MH17’s flights and last minutes of distress.

    Further, local partisans of Ukraine report military flights in the afternoon of July 17 on Twitter, which means military primary radar was active and being recorded for after action report purposes, especially given the shoot downs on the afternoon/evening of July 16.

    The known damaged Ukrainian radars were at Donetsk, Lugansk, and Artemovisk and were taken down 4 to 7 weeks earlier. That civilian and military flights continued throughout up to July 17 means some method of air traffic control must have been present to coordinate and control operations, as hundreds of military bombing and airdrop supply sorties occurred in that time, and civilian overflight included thousands of trips with potentially conflicting routes.

  9. Pieter Omtzigt:
    CTIVD (toezichthouder geheime diensten) bevestigt: volgens diensten had alleen Oekraine operationele BUK systemen in Oost Oekraine 17/7

    https://twitter.com/PieterOmtzigt/status/690486999669678081

    • Double check CTIVD

      What is CTIVD?

      Founding of CTIVD:
      The Commission for Supervision of Intelligence and Security (CTIVD) exists since 2002. The Commission will consider whether the Law on Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 and the safety investigations are carried out properly. In addition, they shall review the actions of the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD).

      Independence CTIVD:
      Supervision of the intelligence and security services should not only be knowledgeable, but also independent of these services and politics.

      Independence CTIVD:
      CTIVD can be seen as the scientific control switch in the network between science and civil service, if related to security. At the request of the government, the CTIVD controls scientists who must guaranty the stamp of scientific independence on governmental reports, related to security. Therefore, scientific experts are first reviewed by the AIVD (Dutch Security Service). Hence, by selected sampling of scientists, artificial scientific independence is implemented into governmental reports, related to security. Dutch scientists just have a conditional probability to see their name on this kind of governmental reports. So double check “facts” from DSB, JIT, CTIVD, or whatever.

      An example from hana333, who lost a relative in the assault on MH17.

      {{{hana333
      3 februari 2015 om 14:02

      [No exchange of information from US intelligence to its partners (AIVD) concerning Safety airspace.] (above Donetsk, BD).

      Is this true?
      Concerning the CTIVD, the committee which should check the role of the security forces, I am not so convinced of its transparency and impartiality. See eg .:

      https://blog.cyberwar.nl/2015/01/dutch-review-committee-on-the-intelligence-and-security-services-ctivd-establishes-knowledge-network-and-feedback-group/

      which states:

      [Although drafts of secret appendices to oversight reports will not be presented to the experts, and the experts will not be involved in case investigations or hearings of persons, the experts may access documents that have not (yet) been declassified by the relevant Minister. Security screenings at the A level [=highest level for non-officials] will be carried out in consultation with the AIVD. The names of the persons involved in providing feedback will be announced following the outcome of the screenings. Not until then, the experts will be involved in investigations.]

      And who carries out the so-called A-level screening??? …… Yes, the AIVD !!!!
      And so the circle is round again.
      MH 17 investigation for months is waste of money, time, energy and, last but not least, the confidence of the citizens.}}}

      Translated into our world of today: we cannot trust the judgments of Tjibbe Joustra of American satellite data, which are said to support the launch site of the alleged BUK near Snizhne. We cannot trust a DSB partly constituted of the SBU, a possible perpetrator. We cannot trust a TNO which is very best friends with its Ukrainian counterpart in Kiev. We need independent scientists in all those institutions.

      So, officially Dutch law prohibits interactions among all kind of institutions to guaranty scientific independence, but the informal truth is very different.

    • [Pieter Omtzigt:
      CTIVD (toezichthouder geheime diensten) bevestigt: volgens diensten had alleen Oekraine operationele BUK systemen in Oost Oekraine 17/7]

      Double check:

      [Those data confirm, among other things, that there was movement and increased activity by Ukrainian Buk surface-to-air missile systems observed within the conflict area in Eastern Ukraine one day ahead of the tragedy.]

      https://www.rt.com/politics/official-word/331834-mh17-russia-storchevoy-letter/

      • We know three major PSR (Prim.Surv.Radar)were damaged long before the downing of MH17:

        Andrew:

        [The known damaged Ukrainian radars were at Donetsk, Lugansk, and Artemovisk and were taken down 4 to 7 weeks earlier. That civilian and military flights continued throughout up to July 17 means some method of air traffic control must have been present to coordinate and control operations, as hundreds of military bombing and airdrop supply sorties occurred in that time, and civilian overflight included thousands of trips with potentially conflicting routes.]

        http://tinyurl.com/ht3dxl2

        There were no financial and technical means to rebuild those PSR immediately. And they would be demolished again. So what could Ukraine decide? Of course, they had some PSR stations left which could be used, but we know they also placed BUK-systems in Eastern Ukraine which covered PSR. One or two BUK-systems were already sufficient:

        https://twitter.com/PieterOmtzigt/status/690486999669678081

        [CTIVD (toezichthouder geheime diensten) bevestigt: volgens diensten had alleen Oekraine operationele BUK systemen in Oost Oekraine 17/7] Twitter Pieter Omtzigt.]

        https://www.rt.com/politics/official-word/331834-mh17-russia-storchevoy-letter/

        [Those data confirm, among other things, that there was movement and increased activity by Ukrainian Buk surface-to-air missile systems observed within the conflict area in Eastern Ukraine one day ahead of the tragedy.]

        As Eugene already said it is technically quite impossible to connect SSR (Sec.Surv.Radar) with PSR of BUK. In former comments we argued this also was not needed since Ukraine had split Civil Aviation above and Military Aviation below 9700 meters. So planes could not collide and of course Ukrainian BUKS would not shoot their own planes. So in this way they followed the rules of Eurocontrol somewhat and did not foresee any danger.

        But they were very wrong:

        Ukrainian BUKS in Eastern Ukraine were vulnerable because communication among BUKS is not encrypted and by radio. Furthermore, BUK COMMAND VEHICLES maintained contacts with the Dnepropetrovsk airbase, information which must have been intercepted easily by separatists with the help of the Russians.

        So Ukrainian BUKS controlled hundreds of military flights into Luhansk and Donetsk in a very risky manner. Spotters only had to listen to radio traffic between Dnepropetrovsk and BUK COMMAND VEHICLES to know what sort of military planes were coming to shoot them down with Pantsirs.

        Ukraine finally unmasked this spying but was unable to stop it. As a remedy they invented some secret language for their messages. But now real confusion threatened since all civil air traffic (SSR) passed along the PSI of the BUKS.

        Separatists with their alleged BUK in Snizhne tangled with this secret language and military aircraft was not properly distinguished from civil aircraft any longer. And that’s why in this scenario separatists shot down MH17 erroneously thinking it was an AN-26.

        • The theory of Ukraine using BUK for guidance of military traffic is complete nonsense.
          A BUK radar is not designed for ATC just as a Lada is not designed to transport cargo like a truck is. Both share a common thing: wheels.

          Military have their own radar infrastructure based on PSR. These radars are fixed at military bases as well as mobile.
          Make sure you write facts or I will need to put your comments on moderation.

          • Well, you may be right and that’s why I warned it is just a scenario. But now I would like to ask you to prove separatists definitely were not able to intercept any radio communication between BUK COMMAND VEHICLES and Dnepropetrovsk airbase concerning flights of military aircraft on Eastern Ukraine. I mean ATC was not my point which I easily can give up.

            Thinking about the downing of MH17 has cost me an awful lot of time and I am very grateful for your patience and for all freedom I have got on this site. I am pretty sure it is this site which will eventually discover what really happened. I wish you all the best…

  10. Ok this is something unexpected http://tass.ru/en/politics/855441
    “Russia is prepared to provide once again all primary radar data it has for the investigation of the loss of the Malaysia’s Flight MH17, the deputy head of the Federal Agency for Air Transport ”

    Even more. The whole story with radar data is changing. It is not destroyed.

    “Russia back in August 2014, in other words, immediately after the disaster shared with the Dutch Safety Board all available primary radar data regarding Flight MH17… Russia still keeps these data and will be prepared to present them once again to the organizations of authority concerned,” Storchevoi said

    Seems that Russians are launching an attack on DSB, who mentioned in the report that Russia destroyed that data.

    • I wonder if DSB got it in writing from Russians about the destruction of primary radar data or was it just mentioned during one of the meetings informally. It would be really embarrassing for DSB if the second option is true

    • The second part of the news is even funnier

      http://tass.ru/en/politics/855451

      Marcel, I think your blog is appreciated in Mordor :). They strike for weakest points in “official version” that were identified by your articles and contributions from commenters

    • Liane Theuer // February 9, 2016 at 5:24 pm // Reply

      Antidyatel, you didn´t read the article well :
      “Russia keeps primary radar data exclusively in a video format, which does not contradict the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).”

      Oleg Sotrchevoy said nothing about Raw-Data ! The Russians want to give once again the video to the DSB or JIT. So – nothing new.

      • Thanks. My fault to skip through the rest of the article. The option of Russians actually preserving raw data was too exciting.;)

        • There is not a chance in the world that Russia did not save raw radar data for every day in which a Ukrainian plane or MH17 was shot down near their border just because of the accusations that have flown. If and when it is truly necessary, it will be released and used.

          • Antidyatel // February 10, 2016 at 2:31 am //

            True, but I thought that they already decided that it is time to strike. Timing seems to be good as European population is getting more receptive to version different to “official” one. Particularly after dejavu of “Strange War” in Syria. USA was pretending to have War with ISIS for 1 year and then ISIS just invaded Europe with 20 smth “migrants”. Occupation of European main cities by “migrants” is obvious for every European citizen. Western leaders obviously deceived their population (again), so now that population will doubt other stories as well.

          • I don’t see how Russia could suddenly release raw radar data after saying for more than a year and a half that it was not stored. They would then be admitting that they’ve been lying and would lose any credibility that they have. Nobody would believe that the raw data is authentic and I don’t see any way it could be verified.

  11. What’s wrong with the video format? That it could be manipulated?
    Ask for the whole week video then and check it

  12. There seems to be a clear contradiction between Oleg Sotrchevoy’s letter and the DSB report about Russia’s description of how it saves its radar data.

    Oleg Sotrchevoy wrote that “Russian air traffic authorities store primary radar data exclusively in the form of videos”.

    The word ‘exclusively’ here should mean for all Russian primary radar data, but the DSB said that Russia claims to save radar data from inside its own territority differently to that from outside it (such as where MH17 was flying).

    Page 42 of the DSB report says:
    “2.9.5.3 Recording of surveillance radar data

    The Russian Federation did not provide the radar data stating that no radar data was saved, but instead provided the radar screen video replay, which showed combined surveillance primary and secondary radar. In the absence of the underlying radar data (so-called raw data), the video information could not be verified.

    The Federal Air Transport Agency of the Russian Federation stated that because the crash had occurred outside Russian Federation territory, no radar data was saved, nor was it required to be saved by national requirements. The Federal Air Transport Agency confirmed that if the event had occurred in Russian Federation territory, the recorded radar data would have been saved in accordance with Russian Federation requirements.

    [The Russian Federal Aviation] regulation, ‘CNS and aeronautical telecommunications’, states that information that is supplied through aeronautical telecommunication networks and radar data sources to the displays installed at the working positions of air traffic controllers should be recorded by special equipment.”

    My understanding of that page is that “the underlying radar data (so-called raw data)” which Russia did not provide, is the “information that is supplied through aeronautical telecommunication networks and radar data sources to the displays …”, and that this would have been saved “if the event had occurred in Russian Federation territory.”

    The DSB said that this was confirmed by the Federal Air Transport Agency. Oleg Sotrchevoy is the deputy head of that organisation, but he tells a completely different story of primary radar data being stored exclusively in the form of videos.

  13. I don´t know if „Kolchuga passive sensor“ stores data :
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolchuga_passive_sensor

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