None of the international media report on the failure by Russia to hand over radardata of 2nd radarstation

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The Dutch Public Prosecution Service at April 3, 2018 published a press report stating that two independant radar specialists confirmed the earlier conclusion by the Joint Investigation Team that a BUK missile in flight could possibly not have been detected by Russian radar.

Russia stated in a September 2016 pressconference, a few days before JIT would release information on the preliminary results of the criminal investigation, that Russian radar would be able to detect a missile when launched from an area south of Snizhne.

The Dutch Public Prosecution Service press report included some more interesting details included in this PDF. It states

No data from the Buturinskoe radar station were provided.

In March 2017 the Public Prosecution Service asked the authorities of the Russian Federation to provide
the radar images (from 14 July 2014 up to and including 18 July 2014) from the Ust-Donetsk and
Buturinskoe radar stations, or other radar stations that had the environment of Lugansk and Donetsk
within their reach, in the ASTERIX format.

None of the international media like newspapers and online media reported this! They all failed to report that Russia failed to hand over the Buturinskoe radar station data.

There is one exception! FlightGlobal mentioned it. 

Investigators had sought data from a second radar station, sited at Baturinskaya, but none has been supplied by the Russian government.

This is another example of media failure on MH17.

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10 Comments on None of the international media report on the failure by Russia to hand over radardata of 2nd radarstation

  1. Joerg Heinrich // April 12, 2018 at 9:52 pm // Reply

    I believe the statements of the JIT do not vote.

    Several statements of the JIT seems not to be correct.

    1.) The claim that a 600 m/s to 900 m/s fast rocket can not be seen from the Utes-T Air Surveillance Radar.
    (Utes-T is the en-route primary radar that monitored MH17)

    a.) JIT argues that the highly doppler-shifted echoes of fast-moving objects are cut off to avoid clutter (600m/s give around 5kHz doppler-shift at 1,5GHz).

    According to my knowledge as an engineer of communications engineering (which is technically partly similar to radar technology), the opposite is true.

    To avoid clutter [1] radar for the air surveillance will surpress echos with doppler-frequency zero to avoid ground echoes or ground clutter and suppress the low doppler-frequency-echos to avoid cloud or rain clutter, etc.

    Classically, that makes the MTI of a pulse Doppler radar [2], from clutter by fast objects with large doppler shift echos, I have never heard anything – what should be out the an fast objects making echos (that you do not want to see)?

    b.) The use of the air surveillance does not match the suppression of fast moving objects.

    Modern fighter jets fly almost all 2 times the speed of sound that are over
    600 m/s, Russian Mig-25 and Mig-31 up to 900 m/s.

    A radar that, in some cases (1), does not display objects that are significantly faster than a commercial aircraft with about 250 m/s – that will not show parts of the military air traffic.

    But I believe that the ability to display military air traffic is important for air traffic control.

    c.) The manufacturer of the Utes-T radar says that the radar detects and displays objects with speed up to 1000 m/s easily [3] – and thus directly contradicts the JIT.

    I doubt that the experts of the JIT have more idea of ​​the radar than the manufacturer.

    2.) The JIT has requested Asterix data on the grounds that the JIT can not work with software in Russian language.

    That is questionable. Because about 1/3 of the JITs are Ukrainians who get along better with technical Russian than with technical English.

    3.) If, according to JIT, a Utes-T Radar can not see any fast missiles, why was it so important for the JIT to get the radar data raw?

    (1) the case that a fast aircraft (fighter maybe) flys direct to the radar




    • I tend to agree with you. It is far more likely Russia deleted the radar plots of the missile from the RAW radardata.
      There should be at least two plots. I spoke to a radar expert and he also believed a missile could be detected.
      JIT made earlier mistakes in radar, stating ASTERIX is required by ICAO. Not true. These are stupid mistakes and if ever a courtcase will come, the lawyer for RF will for sure mention this.

      • Joerg Heinrich // April 12, 2018 at 10:31 pm // Reply

        I think it is too easy to say if it is a mistake if JIT says somthing wrong, an then speak of intent desinformation if russian officials say somthing wrong.

        Its possible that the russians restrain the raw radar-data to falsify the radar-data.

        But it is also possible that the russians restrain the raw radar-data to set up a trap to whos invent a fals story of the shootdown.

        We dont know — but the story of the “one lonly russian TELAR” drifing half around the donnbass sounds stange — or fictitious

    • Almaz-Antey’s BS cover story (and the real purpose of sudden “finding” of Ust-Donetsk raw data) was that a missile from Zaroschenskoe could not be detected by Ust-Donetsk radar because of a near-zero radial velocity of the missile (90° angle between missile’s velocity vector and radar-to-missile direction). But then A-A couldn’t explain why the missile would not get detected by Baturinskaya radar either, so this is why raw data from it have been “lost”. By the way, the radial velocity of the real missile launched from nearby Pervomayskiy was ~90% for Baturinskaya radar vs that for Ust-Donetsk radar, so if the point was the exceeding of a radial velocity limit indeed, the probability of detection might be higher for Baturinskaya.

      • Joerg Heinrich // April 13, 2018 at 11:57 am // Reply

        To your claim:

        “But then A-A couldn’t explain why the missile would not get detected by Baturinskaya radar either, so this is why raw data from it have been “lost”.

        Simple calculation shows that it is unlikly that the radar in Baturinskaya was able to see the missile.

        1.) Utes-T can detect a 5m^2 radar-cross-section objekt in 360 km distance

        2.) The radars echo-signal power depends on the distance to the power of 4

        3.) A BUK missile has a radar-cross-section around 1m^2 (one squere-meter)

        4.) The radius oder the earth ist nearly 6,400 km

        5.) Utes-T scans 360 degree in 10sec.

        This allows calculate the height of the radar shadow and also to calculate the lower bound for the radar cross section for detectable objects:


        “distance” “height” “cross section”

        50 km 0.1953 km 0.0019 m^2

        100 km 0.7813 km 0.0298 m^2

        150 km 1.7581 km 0.1507 m^2

        200 km 3.1258 km 0.4763 m^2

        250 km 4.8847 km 1.1628 m^2

        300 km 7.0351 km 2.4113 m^2

        350 km 9.5775 km 4.4672 m^2

        360 km 10.1330 km 5.0000 m^2

        A look at the maps shows:

        A distance from ust-donezk to any assumed Buk-flight-paths 150km to 200km

        A distance from Baturinskaya to any assumed Buk-flight-paths 250km to 300km

        This 100 km difference in distance makes a great difference in probability of detection.

        From ust-donezk it is very likly that a Utres-T sees the Buk-missile 2 to 3 times.

        From Baturinskaya it is much less likly that a Utres-T sees the Buk-missile and maybe there is only 1 possility to see the missile because there are not muche more than 10 sec. to 20 sec. between reaching 5 km and leaving the radar shadow and hitting MH17.

        • sotilaspassi // April 16, 2018 at 1:22 pm // Reply

          “From Baturinskaya it is much less likly that a Utres-T sees the Buk-missile”
          Then, why is Russia hiding the Baturinskaya data?

  2. Is there any information about how the video was found from the Ukranian military radar? Who, when the request was sent, who found it and where it was stored for 2 years? What can be seen on it? Screenshots from it? Though what details are there?

  3. “Russia deleted the radar plots of the missile from the RAW radardata.”
    My sources say in RAW radardata (but not in ASTERIX, in this format fakes are possible) that either it is not possible to hide. How do you know what is true?

    • Any object’s data presented in digital form may be easily removed from database. Unless these were encrypted/signed at the time of obtaining with a verifiable encryption key the forgers have no access to. It MAY be hard to insert additional fake objects with plausible data, but in this case (data from an unknown data structure, visualized with a closed source software created by subordinates of the forgers, and absence of synchronized data from another radar to compare) it would be an easy thing too. No objects seems to have been added though.

      • sotilaspassi // April 16, 2018 at 1:18 pm // Reply

        Almaz-Antey has “supercomputers” to generate any/all the test data they need for their radar products. After they have been caught on lies on other matters, one must take their radar data with great caution.

        There was rumors of raw Russian radar data by proRU twitter person(s) one year before Antey brought it up. Person(s) said that data was being edited/cleaned to remove any tracks of where the data originates from (or who leaked it).

        (I forwarded info about it to JIT, there was potentially fake data in the works.)

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