New Bellingcat report “Identifying Khmuryi, the Major General Linked to the Downing of MH17”

At February 15, Daniel Romein, member of the Bellingcat team, published a new report on MH17.

The report’s  conclusion is that the man whose telephone was tapped by the Ukrainian Security Service on 17 July 2014, assuming the SBU correctly identified his voice and/or knew that the intercepted telephone number belonged to him and was thus involved in the transport of the Buk missile launcher that downed MH17 on the same date, is named Sergey Nikolaevich Dubinsky, nicknamed ‘Khmuryi’. Dubinsky is a Russian war veteran and was a colonel in July 2014, fought in the Soviet-Afghan war and later in Chechnya, and later served in the 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade, a unit connected to the ‘GRU’, the Main Intelligence Directorate. This man does not appear to be the same person as the bearded man, who likely coincidentally also used the call sign ‘Khmuryi’ in a June 2014 interview.

Sergey “Khmury” Dubinsky wrote in a forum that he drove a Peugeot 3008 in Ukraine. A black Peugeot 3008 accompanied the Buk that downed MH17.

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37 Comments on New Bellingcat report “Identifying Khmuryi, the Major General Linked to the Downing of MH17”

  1. > A black Peugeot 3008 accompanied the Buk that downed MH17.

    Did Khmury accompany the Buk in his Peugeot 3008 or did he accompany three Gvozdikas?
    See:
    http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/sbu-doubts-buk-received-at-july-15/

    • The conversation where Khmuryi mentioned Gvozdikas he wanted to brought ‘here’ (Marinovka) from Donetsk, took place right after downing of MH17. The second ‘sushka’ he claimed being shut down just now was that Boeing actually.

      • Indeed, two “sushkas” downed “yesterday” suggest that the conversation where Gvozdikas were mentioned took place on 17 July and the second “sushka” downed right now [“the second” seems to be a slip of the tongue instead of “again”] was in fact Boeing. What is remarkable is how confident Khmury is when he talks of that “sushka” downed “right now”. Recall the story of the arrival of a separatist unit at the crash site in Grabovo:
        http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/arrival-of-the-separatists-at-the-crash-sites/
        The commander of the unit says: “They say the Sukhoi [fighter] brought down the civilian plane and ours brought down the fighter.”
        It is apparent that higher-rank commanders of separatists, including Khmury, believed that “theirs” [ours] shot down a Sukhoi [sushka]. Why? Given numerous witness accounts of another plane seen at the time of the MH17 crash, it is natural to conclude that at least one Sukhoi was indeed flying there. The Buk which the separatists deployed somewhere near Snizhne targeted that Sukhoi. But the Sukhoi pilot, being aware of Buk presence, escaped via a manoeuvre. (I read an article about Israel military jets which, while attacking something in Syria, successfully manoeuvred to escape Buk missiles.) As the Sukhoi escaped, the missile which was launched by the separatist-deployed Buk lost the target and destroyed itself, in accordance with its functional algorithm. The launch took place a few seconds after MH17 had been hit by some other missile. According to calculations by mh17webtalkers, the horizon of the Ust-Donetsk radar is 3400 meters. The Sukhoi (likely, a pair of Sukhois) was flying at lower altitudes, the Buk missile destroyed itself at a lower altitude as well.
        The Buk which launched a missile at the Sukhoi arrived to Snizhne via a natural route, this is via Krasny Luch (now Khrustalny). It is well known that AP photographers saw a Buk in Snizhne on 17 July. But that Buk was not the one “we think about”. See
        https://twitter.com/Peter__Leonard/status/605701062226550784
        On 2 June 2015, the AP correspondent Peter Leonard twitted: “Some of my inept note-taking when an AP colleague called me just after midday from near Snizhne on July 17 #Buk”
        The attached picture showed a hand-written note:
        ———–
        Buk anti-aircraft missile
        clear sound of Grad coming from South
        Snizhne – 11 am
        ———-
        Peter Leonard stayed in Kiev, AP photographers arrived to Snizhne and called him. In his note, Leonard put down the essentials – what, where, when.
        At 11 am Kiev time, the “Kursk Buk” was on the Makiivka road.

        • I like Your idea/plot, it is really something.
          Please, contact JIT!
          They suffer without such new fresh and crunchy ideas.
          So, to compare Your battle field picture with the JIT’ and MoD’ pictures I have seen new players
          JIT: MH17, 1 BUK-TELAR, 1 RADAR
          MoD: MH17, 1 Su-25, a few BUK-TELAR, 3 RADARS – right?
          You: MH17, pair Su-25, a few BUK-TELAR, 1 RADAR

          I’m just a bit worried that the battlefield near Snezhnoe is little room for all parties…
          Look at!
          I can not ignore MoD statements at 21/07/2014/.
          They still have not given up on their 3 (three) radars…

          • sotilaspassi // February 23, 2017 at 7:05 pm //

            “21/07/2014/.
            They still have not given up on their 3 (three) radars…”
            RU MOD lied from the beginning to the end.
            So, do not be a fool.

        • Mh17webtalkers (consisting exclusively of pro-Ru trolls, propagandists and conspiracists, thanks to the admin who has blocked all sensible users and closed new registrations) blatantly lie about 3400 m, and are well aware of that. Utes-T antenna with cosecant-squared radiation pattern radiates/receives power at the radar horizon (tilt angle 0°) at only ~5 dB from its peak (tilt angle 2°). This is more than enough to detect Su-25 (the more so if with armaments) 171 km away. Even in the worst case (not taking into account the height of the antenna, and the relief) the minimal elevation of targets like Su-25 to be visible over there by Ust’-Donetsky radar is below 2000 m, while clouds were above 3000 m. If you believe yet some Su-25 was flying over there, try to think why Russia removed all marks of it from the “newly discovered” radar data.

          • I am not an expert in radars, so I can’t argue over their capabilities. Yet, there are certain things in the case that are not in line with the mainstream scenario. 1) The confidence of the local separatist commanders that it was a Sukhoi which was shot down + witness accounts of having seen other plane(s); 2) An unrealistic route for the arrival and escape of the “Kursk Buk” – see comments to the following post
            http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/award-winning-investigative-journalim-of-correctv-mh17-corrected/
            3) A hint that a Buk arrived to Snizhne via Krasny Luch – see comments to the following post
            http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/two-new-buk-sightings/
            4) Peter Leonard’s note with “11 am”
            5) Inconsistency over bow-ties – just two (not counting the Akkermans-found bow-tie) and of light weight

          • sotilaspassi // February 24, 2017 at 7:51 am //

            >1) The confidence of the local separatist commanders that it was a Sukhoi which was shot down

            During previous days SU25s were used to attack RUbel forces between Snizhne and Russia. They tried to fly above 5km to avoid MANPADs.
            -> it would be logical to assume SU25
            Also enforcement/suplies were tried to deliver to trapped troops between NovoRussia and Russia with AN26. AN26 was shot down 14Jul, some rebels say it was with a BUK (they lied, but anyway).
            -> initial rebel and Russian news reported a downing of AN26 when MH17 came down.

            >+ witness accounts of having seen other plane(s);

            Is there any such eyewitness records that do not conflict with each other & radar?
            I think no. Most are silly lies, easy to debunk.
            Initial eyewitnesses recorded 17.7 mention only rocket.
            “fjet” was invented when debris was found to be civilian.

            >2&3) An unrealistic route for the arrival and escape of the “Kursk Buk”

            It does not change the fact that MH17 was shot from rebel area.
            It does not change the fact that Russian TELAR 332 was in rebel hands, near snizhne.
            It does not change the fact that MH17 was shot with BUK.

            >5) Inconsistency over bow-ties – just two (not counting the Akkermans-found bow-tie) and of light weight

            8 of the found warhead fragments match with Bowtie vs weight.
            It is proven that about 70% of fragments deform to unrecognizable form.
            Rebels had days & weeks time to sanitize the MH17 crash area from BUK remains.
            Impossible to fake a bowtie through boeing fuselage into captain body.
            Also BUK manufacturer agreed in spring 2015 that damage match 100% with 9N314M.

            It would seem the rebel BUK had capability to use 9M38 and 9M38M1 missiles.
            Rebels had access to both 9M38 and 9M38M1 (Kursk 53rd brigade had them near border).
            Some of 9M38 and 9M38M1 have 9N314M warhead with bowtie+filler fragments.
            None of the found fragments indicate 9N314 warhead was used.

            BUK launch vs MH17 was witnessed and photographed by several people.
            (+BUK manufacturer demonstrated that warhead size was 70kg or larger)

          • sotilaspassi // February 24, 2017 at 7:59 am //

            +The only BUK seen+photographed+videographed+SATimaged near the possible launch area at 17.7 was in the hands of the “rebels”.

          • abcd,
            1) lets assume there was Su-25 over there (that Russia had a ‘good’ reason to remove from its radar data). What does this have to do with the shotdown MH17 with a Buk missile, in your opinion?
            2) It’s a documented fact that Buk 332 was delivered to Snizhne from Donetsk. Even if this seems illogical to people who are not aware of all the motives for using this route.
            3) According to the JIT, the Buk was being evacuated from Snizhne via the centre of Krasnyi Luch the evening of July 17. On July 18 Dan’ka Radon’ka wrote “Yesterday this BUK was being carried through the centre of our town.” So what?
            4) 11 am may mean anything: London time, or when they came to Snizhne, or when they heard the sound of Grads, or …
            5) If bow-ties really pointed to the perpetrators, obviously all reachable ones had been collected by (pro-)Russian forces before the investigators got a chance to.

          • I can’t add anything useful about radars and Su-25 to what I’ve already said. If I knew as to how a plane can be invisible on a radar, I would say that “sushka” was flying over there to provoke the separatist-deployed Buk to launch a missile. Witness accounts were too many to just ignore them. Anyway, the fact is that Khmury on SBU’s tape and the separatists in the video of the crash site were talking about “sushka”, not An-26. No single word about An-26. It is clear that the “news” of the downing of An-26 originated from locals who saw a big plane falling and, with knowledge of the shootdown of An-26 on 14 July, concluded that it was again the same type of aircraft.
            About the bow-ties: doubts and questions were raised in the well-known letter of Rosaviatsia. Just find and re-read it. In particular, it was said in the letter that there were no documentation of how and where one of the two bow-ties was found (somewhere in the cockpit). “Deleting” specific fragments made no sense, as the alleged perpetrators could not know how many and where exactly those fragments were located in the debries and bodies (if I correctly remember, there are 1500 bow-ties in the warhead). The body of the captain was the most obvious object to check on. But with all their alleged “sanitizing” efforts, the alleged Russian or pro-Russian perpetrators managed to leave one bow-tie in the captain. In contrast, planting one or two specific fragments is a relatively easy job.

          • > It’s a documented fact that Buk 332 was delivered to Snizhne from Donetsk. Even if this seems illogical to people who are not aware of all the motives for using this route.
            At first, the Buk had to be delivered to Donetsk. Indeed, I can’t imagine any motives for choosing the route with shelling and fighting near Lugansk and the low overpass in Perevalsk. The only reason for the Buk to “travel” along that route was the existence of videos and photos of something on the Volvo lowloader driving between the Motel on the Makiivka highway and Torez. As the Kursk convoy in Russia was photographed and filmed beginning from June, there was some time to photoshop something on the lowloader into a Buk TELAR from the Kursk convoy. The most distinguishable Buk was chosen.
            The alleged evacuation of the Buk via Krasny Luch is not realistic, either. If the Buk had travelled from Krasny Luch via the eastern route to Severny, then how did it get to Nechui-Levitsky Street in south-western Lugansk? If the Buk had turned from Krasny Luch to the west, then, again, the low overpass in Perevalsk and the war zone near Lugansk (plus, remember the Lysenko-mentioned video which was never presented).
            The comment of a Krasny Luch resident (Dan’ka Radon’ka) who saw a Buk carried through the center of his town was never included in any Ukrainian or pro-Ukrainian research on MH17, though Russian-language social networks were combed thouroughly. The reason for exclusion: Danka’s comment contradicts the “Kursk Buk” scenario.
            > 11 am may mean anything: London time, or when they came to Snizhne, or when they heard the sound of Grads, or ….
            London time is especially convincing: the most helpful habit for an international journalist is to use his favorite London time instead of the local time. Did his counterparts in Kiev, Astana, Moscow use the London time, too? For instance, the journalist is invited to a press briefing in Kiev by 1 pm, EEST. He writes down: by 11 am. Then, for instance, he calls his photographer and instructs him to be at the briefing by … what time?
            In the case of Peter Leonard’s note, its content is crystal clear:
            what – Buk and sound of Grads from south
            where – Snizhne
            when – 11 am

          • abcd,
            I hope you fully realize your suggestion on ““sushka” flying over there to provoke the separatist-deployed Buk to launch a missile” is an absolute nonsense. To provoke launching a missile for what? For it to miss the sushka and hit the Boeing? A total bullshit. IF a sushka was really flying over, the only sensible explanation is it was flying an usual combat mission. This MAY explain why Russia removed its marks from the radar data. Just because it would be obvious the sushka was the designated target. However, why would Ukraine hide such a fact (at least from the public)? I see no rational reason. IF some warplane was flying over clouds yet, I would rather suppose it was a Russian one. Then everything would be explainable. As for your suggestion on planted bow-ties, it would be reasonable only if some post-Soviet model of warhead was actually used, just to shift the blame onto Ukraine. There is no rational reason to pass off 9N314 for 9N314M, but there is a good reason to pass off any newer Russian warhead for 9N314M.

          • abcd,
            If you claim not to believe in the plausible evidences in support of a quite sensible version pointing to the Kursk Buk, just because these indicate that things were going on not in an optimal way, and at the same time believe in improbable fables (for no sensible version at all) which are based on nothing but propaganda, you would better post somewhere else, like mh17webtalk or any other resource managed by believers in RussiaIsInnocent, where such a religious approach is welcomed. Here everyone is expected to base their opinion on facts.

            You wrote somewhere above “The Buk which the separatists deployed somewhere near Snizhne targeted that Sukhoi.” Can you elaborate from here please? Do you have any reasonable version about why/how MH17 was downed, which would not contradict known facts? Only don’t tell something in line with “YouLieAboutEverything” which is the only “version” of all those believers mentioned above.

            P.S. Do you really not know where the bypass is?
            https://www.google.com/maps?ll=48.44329,38.80470&z=17&t=h

          • > Do you have any reasonable version about why/how MH17 was downed, which would not contradict known facts?

            I have a version which contradicts one fact, namely, the absence of Sukhoi(s) on radars. I will wait for some more details to be disclosed. Just over recent days, new details have emerged. In particular, I realized that Khmury and his comrades were confident that the downed plane was Sukhoi. (Even at the background of the video footage of separatists at the crash site, voices can be heard saying affirmatively “sushka, sushka”). The idea of AN-26 originated from locals who had mistaken a big plane falling for AN. In fact, the confidence of Khmury and his comrades that the downed plane was SU suggests that they did NOT wait for AN-26 at that time, at that place. Thus, the scenario where the Buk crew were waiting for AN-26 to appear at certain time from certain direction and launched a missile as soon as they detected something similar, is no longer valid.

            I am convinced that the case of MH17 should be approached not like a single equation ax=b, but like a system of equations, with unknown x, y, z.

            In the meantime, I would like to beg of BBC journalists – lucky ones – to email Khmury again and ask him why he and his comrades believed it was Sukhoi.

          • abcd,
            You have written NO version. Sushkas were expected as no other type of aircraft bothered Khmury “and his comrades”. The Buk crew obviously did not report to those soldiers of fortune what target they fired at. And hardly knew that themselves. The question is why the crew either was ordered or fired at own discretion at the target appeared to be the airliner.

        • First, about the bypass. As I explained previously, in a social network I found a resident of the Perevalsk area and asked him whether it is easy or not to bypass the low overpass. He answered: Путепровод объехать сложно. This may be translated as “not easy”, or “difficult”, or “hard” – the word сложно may imply various degrees of complexity. So, I concluded that, for transporting a tall Buk TELAR, the route Lugansk-Perevalsk-Debaltsevo-Donetsk had no advantages over roads from Severny to Krasny Luch. Given a war zone near or at western and south-western parts of Lugansk, I concluded that the route Lugansk-Perevalsk-Debaltsevo-Donetsk was a highly unlikely route for Buk TELAR (both back and forth). You make me to repeat what I’ve already explained here
          http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/award-winning-investigative-journalim-of-correctv-mh17-corrected/
          I am not sure what you meant when posting the map of Perevalsk. Did you mean the bypass via Dorozhnya St-Pivnichnodonetska St-Chernihivskyi Ln? There are several sharp turns there, which – at best – are not easy for a long, tall, and heavy machine.

  2. The well-known SBU recordings of allegedly 17 July:
    https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=MVAOTWPmMM4
    – at 9:22 am (according to SBU) Khmury says that Buk (or something) will travel with Vostock’s tanks
    – at 9:54 am (according to SBU) Khmury charges an unnamed “”DNR” terrorist” with the task of accompanying “this little thing” to Pervomaiske
    – SBU timed the conversation about Gvozdikas as 9:08 am. When did it really take place?

  3. neantichrist // February 25, 2017 at 5:19 am // Reply

    Dear sotilaspassi!!
    Wish You all the best in Your fight (like Mr. Slozhny) and at last to beat 😉 the propaganda machine.

    I am sure that being in dialogue with different persons which worked sift by shift for the sake of money under “user name_____”, the most important thing is to stay calm and smile sometime debunking that attempts to produce “alternative past”.
    Only because of that I “worried” abt – is there enough space for whole arms which were used by propaganda machine against MH17?

    Seriously speaking, I am sure that between 2 dates (17/07/2014 and 19/07/2014) there was a period without “propaganda machine” in the Russia leadership.
    Mr Putin named the crash MH17 as “a crime” (18/07) and MoD reported at the same date abt many Ukraine’s BUK-TELAR in many places around the crash site.And no one Ukraine’s fighter around B-777 in the sky.
    https://russian.rt.com/article/41461
    Look at!
    3 launch places!! do not forget – without Zaroschenskoe….
    It is like a crowd of BUK-TELAR waiting for a target, isn’t it?
    The most specific and simultaneously simple thing is the base of such “Intelligence” – how Russian MoD undestood and CONFIRMED that a crowd Ukrainian BUK-TELAR had possibilities downed MH17?
    They had based on the same base when were speaking abt Su-25 near MH17…
    Can You discuss such absurd without a smile?

    After 18/07 propaganda machine was switch on and “calculations by mh17webtalkers”(©Mr.abcd) started to change the past.

  4. On 2 March, Bellingcat published a new report on Khmury: “The role of Sergey Dubinsky in the downing of MH17”. In the report, Bellingcat parsed the SBU-intercepted phone calls by Khmury of 17 July, 2014. That is exactly the subject I planned to discuss after my comments here of 25 Feb. I took a pause and now I continue.

    My key point is that Khmury’s phone calls timed by SBU as 9:08 am, 9:22 am, 9:23 am and 9:54 am were a trick intended to deceive SBU. While the real Buk was driven to Snizhne via Krasny Luch, Khmury was talking about a Buk as if it were to be delivered from Donetsk. He feared of an airstrike like that of 15 July and he suspected or knew for sure that his phone calls were taped (no wonder). The plan to get a real Buk was discussed via other means of communication, while the phone number we see on SBU’s recordings was used for non-important or deceptive talks.

    For a long time, I believed that the call timed 9:08 am, with Buryat, was a concoction by SBU. It sounds incoherent, weird, stupid. These very qualities of the call urged one participant of the Russian forum Glav.su to ask Khmury a question as to whether the recording (9:08 am) was an SBU concoction (follow the link to 2 Aug 2015 in Bellingcat’s report of 2 March). In contrast to what that person apparently expected, Khmury replied: Запись аутентична (The recording is authentic). Putting this reply together with the arrival of the real Buk via Krasny Luch (see my comments here of 22, 23, 24, 25 Feb), I concluded that the phone call of 9:08 was artificial and intended to make SBU believe that the Buk would be transported from Donetsk. The same goes for the phone calls of 9:22, 9:23 and 9:54.

    In the past, I was in particular suspicious of the call of 9:23 am, with Sanych. It does not fit the conversation of the same men, Khmury and Sanych, recorded in the evening of 16 July. The 16 July tape is here:
    https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=94LF4sg14Zc&feature=youtu.be&t=1m4s

    In the evening of 16 July, Khmury is upset and worried because of frequent attacks of Ukrainian “sushkas”, he is anxious to receive a Buk in the morning and not sure the Buk will come. Sanych, in his remarks, sounds sympathizing and supportive. However, next morning Khmury tells Sanych as a matter of fact: “with yours [vehicles?] my, this Buk will travel, where to drive it in order to put it into the convoy?” Sanych replies as a matter of fact: “behind Motel”. No reaction by Sanych, no emotion, nothing like “Oh, you got it!” The reason for that lack of emotion is that the dialogue was artificial, to deceive SBU.

    To sum up, in the morning of 17 July, Khmury believed that he outsmarted SBU. In fact, he played into SBU’s hands.

    • The Buk was photographed/filmed/mentioned to be seen on the route Donetsk-Pervomayske many times. Your version is fictitious, but it changes nothing anyway. Whatever Russian Buk TELAR was on the site by 14:00 on July 17. Are you going yet to tell how come MH17 was shot down, in your opinion?

      • >The Buk was photographed/filmed/mentioned to be seen on the route Donetsk-Pervomayske many times.

        Just to be clear, you should state that several hours after the shootdown, pictures and videos of a BUK on this route began to be released without any attribution of metadata and thus no ability to tie the pictures/videos to a specific time and date. This was followed up after several YEARS by the uncovering of a BUK on a commercial satellite image that coincidentally lines up with a newly released video.

        Think about it. All those billions spent on CIA analysts and NRO imagery every year, and they couldn’t even be bothered to release the blurry image off the publicly available Digital Globe picture in the first few days/weeks/months.

        It is also fascinating that contemporaneous mentions of BUK only show up on American controlled Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook but that a perusal of VK.com public message boards for Shakhtersk, Torez, and Snizhne have no mention at all of it passing through their towns until after the shootdown. The locals did not hesitate at all to constantly post about messages, images, and videos of battles, shelling, military convoys and aerial combat operations. They openly discussed the rebels firing anti-aircraft missile weaponry at military jets all day long on July 16.

        There are literally several dozen (maybe even 100) YouTube videos of random people (and local news organizations) filming and posting Ukrainian BUK movements throughout 2014, most of them uploaded within hours of the sighting off dashcams and cell phone cameras. Thousands of cars, all with dashcam recorders must have passed the supposed Russian BUK on the route it allegedly took, yet its taken years for a single video to be uploaded. Apparently not a single person in all Donbass was interested in showing they saw this fascinating war machine loaded with huge green missiles on the day it actually moved? Or did they all just get religion and suddenly adhere to military secrecy protocols just for this piece of equipment? Preposterous.

  5. What is remarkable about the phone call of 9:08 am is that it prompted SBU to take one decision ad hoc, very swiftly. The conversation between Khmury and Buryat was a perfect thing to be presented as evidence of the downing of a passenger plane by a Russian-supplied Buk. However, the first visual evidence, the “Kursk Buk” on the Makiivka highway, was tied to about 11 am (because of the shadows). To smooth the time difference, a decision was made to post a news item about “waiting” in a friendly social media community. See
    http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/bellingcat-presents-new-social-media-evidence-for-buk-presence-in-donetsk/
    “…As of 9:15 am, the vehicle was located at the intersection of Shakhtostroiteley and Ilycha. The militants got out of their cars, blocking 2 of the far left lanes. Obviously, they were waiting for logistical guidance.”

    The news was posted at 9:40 am. It firmly connected the “arrival” of the “Kursk Buk” in Donetsk to its further “trip” east to Snizhne, “documented” by pre-existed photographs/videos and Tweets by Wowihay and his likes.

    However, there is a problem – no one had seen that Buk at the intersection of Shakhtostroiteley Blvd and Ilycha Avenue. The author of the post did not provide a photograph, but it may be explained by the failing of his phone’s battery. Yet, the Buk allegedly stood at the intersection for some time, and it is a residential area, with food stores and businesses. The Donetsk regional children’s hospital is located at Shakhtostroiteley, 14, not far from the intersection. But no one took a photo of the Buk (from a car or from behind a corner), no one mentioned it in a post or a comment, except for those who referred to the above post. No independent mentions of that Buk.

    A phantom Buk came into existence several hours before the downing of MH17.

    • Can you please stop telling the conspiracy bullshit for now, and start from the moment when whatever Russian Buk had come to the site near Pervomayskiy?

  6. The trip to Pervomaiskiy was part of Khmury’s idea to deceive SBU (see my comment of 3 March).

    As for how MH17 was shot down, it is clear that it was not the way which has been implied so far: i.e. the Buk crew was waiting for AN-26 at certain time, from certain direction and took Boeing for AN. The crew of the Buk which arrived via Krasny Luch did not wait for AN-26 and could not mix up a tiny SU with a large Boeing. Something different worked out.

    • So, predictably, you have got no version. Just because the one which could satisfy pro-Ru people simply cannot be invented with the facts given. You suggest all the same “AllYourEvidencesAreForged” and pro-Ru conspiracy bullshit which at that is based on nothing at all. Plus, for some odd reason, a fantasy about an alternative route for delivery of that same Buk that same place, which fired that same time when MH17 was downed, but not at it, huh! But NO even deceptive version on downing of MH17, since you understand the questions arisen after suggestion of any pro-Ru version will be unanswerable.

  7. By the way, as Khmury’s phone calls in the morning of 17 July were a cover-up for the arrival of a Buk via Krasny Luch, his order to transport the Buk to Pervomaiskiy (the call at 9:54 am), south of Snizhne, may mean that in fact the Krasny-Luch Buk was deployed north of Snizhne (not sure, but may be). And then Correctiv might have been incidentally correct when having identified the location of the missile launch near some village north of Snizhne.
    About Correctiv see
    http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/award-winning-investigative-journalim-of-correctv-mh17-corrected/
    They are fraudsters but even fraudsters and liars may incidentally tell the truth.

    To Slozhny: the missile launch I am talking in this comment is not the launch that shot down MH17.

  8. Ii. Now let’s list the arguments that explain why Buk did not travel via the Severny-Lugansk-Donetsk-Snizhne route on 17 July.
    1.
    a) This route is substantially longer than the Severny-Krasny Luch-Snizhne route: roughly 280 km vs 150–170 km (depending on the chosen subroute),
    b) There was fighting and shelling at and west-southern outskirts fof Lugansk. Do not forget that on 14 July Ukrainian forces took Bile on the main road Lugansk-Donetsk and Roskishne near the area where the Lugansk video was filmed. On 15 July Ukrainian forces suddenly left Bile and Roskishne for unknown reasons. See my comments here:
    http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/award-winning-investigative-journalim-of-correctv-mh17-corrected/
    c) Dubinsky’s reply to the BBC email. He wrote that for those with the knowledge of geography and where the frontline was, the idea of a Buk driven via that route was laughable.
    d) The 3.8 overpass in Perevalsk. See my comments to the same post
    http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/award-winning-investigative-journalim-of-correctv-mh17-corrected/
    Slozhny posted a sattelite photo of Perevalsk where an improvised crossing atop of the rails can be seen. It is also seen that the crossing is blocked with slabs. Even if on 17 July slabs were absent, driving Buk atop of the rails would be risky. What may be acceptable for a desperate commercila driver anxious to economize on time and fuel is not feasible for the driver of a vehicle with a tall, heavy and explosive load. Bypassing the overpass across the town would be possible but difficult – see Slozhny’s sat picture. The regular rail crossing is at 48.4367, 38.8205.

    2) Sightings of Buk in Snizhne in the morning and soon after noon (see my comment I), which do not fit the official timeline. Add to this the discrepancies of the Zuhres video.

    3) There are two hours – between 9 and 11 am – when essentially no one saw the Buk while it was allegedly in Donetsk.
    As I said in my comment of 3 March (see above), the post in the VKontakte community “Donetsk is Ukraine!” was a result of an ad hoc decision made by SBU when it intercepted Khmury’s phone call of 9:08 am on 17 July. The temptation to use that intercept as evidence was very strong. Later, however, SBU refrained from using it officially. I guess they realized that the real admin of the real community might be questioned by investigators. By 2016 either the admin-related risks had gone or they looked negligible: on 4 March 2016 the post in “Donetsk is Ukraine!” was presented to the public by Bellingcat.

    Meanwhile, the gap between 9 and 11 am was filled up with four tweets by @666-_mancer. He diligently figured as a chorus of Donetsk residents who as if saw a Buk in the streets. As Bellingcat explains, @666_mancer “collected witness accounts from others and reposted them in one place” because for him it was safe while “it is often not safe for someone to post a sighting of separatist military maneuvres”. However, this argument is void. Donetsk area residents were not fearful of posting info on separatists. The very existence of the VK community “Donetsk is Ukraine!”, with about 3500 members, is a confirmation that pro-Kiev people in the area did not hide their anti-separatist views. Let’s look at the comments to the post in “Donetsk is Ukraine!”. There are there 10 comments by nine users; of them six used their full name (a given name and surname). Last spring, their accounts were available for strangers, now they are available only for friends). One user, Anatolii Chuprina, wrote in his comment: “And from Makiivka in the direction of Snizhne at 10:40 a convoy passed, consisting of 3 T-64 and 1 Kamaz”. In his second comment he wrote: “I report everything I watch [to the anti-terrorist center]”.

    So, the only “confirmation” of Buk’s presence in Donetsk between 9 am and 11 am is the pseudo-tweets by @666_mancer. There are no independent mentions of Buk in Donetsk – for two hours in a big city!

    Taking into account the points 1 (a, b, c, d), 2 and 3, I am absolutely sure that there were no Buk on the Lugansk-Donetsk road and the Donetsk-Snizhne road on 17 July. The photos and videos presented as evidence were accurately manufactured on the basis of photos and videos taken and filmed by members of the Shakhtarsk battalion between 8 and 15 July. On 8 July, reportedly, the Volvo truck was seized by separatists from the owner; on 15 July Ukrainian forces suddenly ledt Bile and Roskishne which they took from separatists the day before: the Lugansk-Donetsk road had to be under separatist control, otherwise the photo/video evidence was futile. About the Shakhtarsk battalion, see my comments of 4 Feb here
    http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/award-winning-investigative-journalim-of-correctv-mh17-corrected/
    The core of the battalion, formed by the Interior Ministry in mid-June, consisted of men from Shakhtarsj, Torez and Snizhne. Anton Gerashchenko was in direct contact with Shakhtarsk members.

    For almost three years, the investigation and numerous research attempts have been centered around a phantom, while the real Russian Buk, which arrived to Snizhne via Krasny Luch, was left behind the scenes. As for the real weapon, which shot down MH17, it was hidden under a huge pile of fakes, lies and sophisticated cover-up operations. Naturally, the weapon was Ukrainian. Why: the one who created a phantom Buk in advance of the shootdown is the one who downed the airliner.
    (To be continued)

  9. Continuation.
    The question to whic I have no answer is how Ukrainian fighter jets were made invisible on Russian radars. Some kind of ingenious jamming? It may be that Ukrainians know a soft spot in the Russian radar system: Ukraine and Russia were one country up to 1991, their defense industries were closely intertwined up to 2014. I suspect that the absence of military aircraft from radars is the core reason why Russia still did not tell the truth about 17 July (I hope that they will). A failure to detect military aircraft at 20-30 km of the border is a disaster.

    What made me convinced of the presence of Ukrainian fighter jets over the area is the confidence of separatists, including Khmury (Dubinsky), that they shot down sushka, i.e. Su-25 (see my comments of Feb 22-23). This adds up with eyewitness accounts. Also, “another plane” was mentioned here
    http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3393856-v-donetskoi-oblasty-upal-passazhyrskyi-samolet-smy
    This is a news item in a Ukrainian publication, 17 July, 18:10 EEST: “According to a source of Korrespondent.net in Torez, the plane [MH17] fell between the village of Hrabovo in the Shakhtarsk district and Torez… Also, according to locals, an unknown plane was flying simultaneously with the passenger plane”.

  10. There must have been two military jets. If only one jet had been flying over the area, it could have been downed by the Russian Buk (which arrived via Krasny Luch). But two fighter jets at once could not be a target for a sole Buk: if the Buk downed one of them, the other would strike a missile at the Buk.

    Furthermore, the two jets had different tasks. At certain moment one of them pretended to be attacking Snizhne, provoked the Buk to launch a missile, made an anti-aircraft maneuver and flew away. The missile lost the target and destroyed itself. The other jet shot down the passenger plane. The first jet was SU-25: the separatists were confident about sushka. The second jet was MIG-29: 1) It has capabilty to shot down a big plane; 2) Two major and successful efforts were made to ridicule the idea of MIG-29 as a weapon in the MH17 case.

    Recently I re-read responses by journalists and bloggers to the TV program of Mikhail Leontiev in Nov 2014 where he presented as if a sattelite image of MH17 as if being targeted by MIG-29. Journalists and bloggers immediately disclosed that the image was a fake. Each and every detail of the image was wrong! Apparently, FSB (Russia’s Federal Security Service) had nothing to do with that stupid image. The TV presenter Leontiev got the image from someone named Ivan Andrievsky, vice president of the Russian Union of Engineers – a sort of bogus organization. Andrievsky reportedly received the sat image by email from an American engineer. So, either Andrievsky duped Leontiev or Andrievsky was duped himself. It was a strange story.

    Another strange story emerged on 30 June, 2016, when Episode 1 of “MH17 Inquiry” was uploaded on Youtube. The presenter in the video was Alexander Volovik, a man pretending to be a VIP. In fact, Volovik is of no importance, despite his innumerable titles. I wrote about Volovik in comments to
    http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/new-video-states-buk-transport-at-zuhres-was-filmed-at-july-5/
    See my comment of 4 July, 2016.

    Episode 1, as well as the subsequent episodes, looked very strange. My suspicion was – now it is the confidence – that “MH17 Inquiry” was filmed in order 1) to “legitimize” the Zuhres video: as Russians said that the video was not genuine, it is surely genuine; 2) to ridicule the idea that the Makiivka video was a fake; 3) to ridicule the idea that MH17 was shot down by MIG-29. The purpose was to suppress possible doubts over the official version. No one would come forward with the ideas that were ridiculed by the whole world. Everyone fears to look like an idiot.

    Thus, we have two strange stories that involved MIG-29 and were transmitted via persons with a bogus social status – Andrievsky and Volovik. They could have been easily tricked by SBU. For instance, an SBU officer presents himself to Volovik as a FSB officer (no difference in looks, manners, language, plus a false identity card) and offers him to do a service for the Fatherland. Volovik, a man of enormous vanity, happily agrees, imagining himself a hero and dreaming of glory and rewards. All the episodes were filmed at once and then were released one by one.

    Now about the missile. I suggest it was a modified R-27P. P stands for passive radar guidance. See Wikipedia on R-27 air-to-air missile. It is believed that the warhead of R-27 is equipped with rods. But, according to Wikipedia, a version of R-27 has a blast/fragmentation warhead. Even if this info is not correct, the manufacturer of R-27, the Kiev-based company Artem, have sufficient R&D facilities to re-design its products. See, for instance, this
    http://world-defense.com/threads/ukrainian-industry-offers-surface-launched-r-27.2842/
    This is about Artem’s re-design of R-27 into a surface-to-air-missile. Artem, having expertise in re-designing, might have modified the warhead of the R-27 air-to-air missile to equip it with pre-formed fragments.

    Russian experts insist that the fragments presented in the DSB report have very low weights. Table 17 on page 135 of the DSB report contains the Almaz-Antei data on dimensions and weights of preformed fragments in the 9N314M warhead. The dimensions and weights are fixed. This means that they are made of steel of the determined standard, with the determined density. If Russian experts are right about the low weights of the fragments in the DSB report, it means that these fragments were made of sub-standard steel, with lower density. It would be interesting to know what data were supplied to the investigators by Finland.

    • In my comment above, of April 12, I was too cautios over the existence of the blast/ fragmentation version of the R-27 air-to-air missile. Since then, I have seen many mentions of that version. For instance, the following article is a description of R-27 (in Russian) and it clearly states that R-27 may be made in rod and blast/fragmentation versions:
      http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/p27/p27.shtml

      Also, I saw a textbook for military technology students where R-27 is described as having rod and blast/fragmentation versions. The textbook was authored by Professor Boris Shcherbakov and published in 2012.

  11. This is the first part of the series of comments I wrote on 12 April. It failed to get posted properly, but it was meant to be posted first.

    I re-read the Sep 2015 research by Arnold Greidanus and found there some points to support my claim that the alleged Lugansk-Donetsk-Snizhne route was fictitious and that in reality the Russian Buk arrived to Snizhne via Krasny Luch.

    Among other things, Arnold cited the publication of July 2015 in the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta. Translation: “In the morning of 17 July Buk was sent to a position in the Snizhne area. This was observed by locals, around 12:15 pm our freelance correspondent saw Buk driving on its tracks, with four rockets…”

    Thus, Buk was seen in Snizne in the morning by AP photographers (see Peter Leonard’s note) and by locals, according to the Novaya Gazeta freelancer, who also saw Buk, but around 12:15. Thos evidence undermines the timeline of the official version.

    Also, Arnold discussed the Zuhres video: 1) The wind in the video does not match the wind in the area on 17 July; 2) To cover the 24.3 km distance between the Buk sighting points in Zuhres and Torez (25 min), Buk should have been driven with an average speed of 58 km/h. Arnold concluded: “This is not plausible”.

    That’s not all. Arnold was not aware of the 4.5 meter overpass in Torez (48.0333, 38.5679). If Buk had bypassed the overpass via the side lane to the right of the main road and via the improvised crossing atop of the rails (48.0329, 38.5680), it would have taken at least an extra 3 min. Thus, the time for Buk to cover the 24.3 km distance would diminished to 22 min and Buk’s average speed would have amounted to 65 km/h.

    If the driver had been in his senses (he was driving a vehicle with a tall, heavy load with missiles atop) and bypassed the overpass via streets north or south of the main road, then Buk have had no chance to be photographed in Torez at the given time and location.

    Also, as Arnold noted, the Ukrainian blogger Ukraine@war initially doubted the authenticity of the Zuhres video.

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