Dutch Safety Board is a pot calling the kettle black

Facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmailby feather

Dutch Safety Board (DSB) writes in the final report on MH17 that the Russian Federation did not comply to ICAO Annex 11 because it did not record radar data in raw format. It should have reported that to ICAO.

ICAO Annex 11 however does not explicitly defines in what format radar should be recorded. It just states that radar data should be automatically recorded and retained for at least 30 days.

DSB is a typical case of a pot calling the kettle back. DSB failed in many ways as described here.

While on the subject of not being in compliance. Let us have a look at the DSB report.

First of all, DSB did not report that Ukraine UkSATSE failed to report to Eurocontrol that at least one radar station was taken out of order. It was destroyed at June 16 2014. And still was unavailable at July 17, 2014.

Ukraine at least had at July 17 no primary radar coverage over Eastern Ukraine. I have not read this in the report.

DSB also failed to contact Eurocontrol to check if Ukraine had reported any malfunctioning of radars.

An DSB employee (Michiel Schuurman– Senior Air Safety Investigator)  states in a document written by himself  about radar data that air traffic controllers are interviewed after a major event.

Remarkably enough his employer DSB did not interview the controller responsible for guidance of MH17. DSB failed to mention in the final report that it did not interview the controller!

controller-interview

Last but not least: ICAO Annex 13 recommends the investigator to interview eyewitness on the ground. Something DSB failed to do so for unknown reasons.

DSB is a pot calling the kettle black!

 

Facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmailby feather

4 Comments on Dutch Safety Board is a pot calling the kettle black

  1. The DSB is a pot that cooked a report.

  2. Integrated radar PSR and SSR in Ukraine would not have prevented the assault on MH17.

    Rules of Eurocontrol prescribe how PSR and SSR have to be integrated.

    PSR = Primary Surveillance Radar (reflected radar beams)
    SSR = Secondary Surveillance Radar (aircraft with ADS-B)

    http://www.eurocontrol.int/publications/eurocontrol-standard-radar-surveillance-en-route-airspace-and-major-terminal-areas

    This Standard contains the requirements for independent (primary) and cooperative independent (secondary) radar surveillance for application in the provision of Air Traffic Services.

    [We split radars in: SSR in Dnepropetrovsk and PSR in BUK-TELARs to explore the consequences of these rules:

    Above meant Standard only works for planes with ADS-B, for civil aircraft. Since, in case of military aircraft without ADS-B, Dnepropetrovsk detects no plane at all on SSR.

    But now we have a problem if Dnepropetrovsk detects a plane with ADS-B (MH17) and BUK-TELAR (PSR) (Ukrainians) detects a military object (II-76 or AN-26).

    If both systems had been integrated (requirement of Eurocontrol) then Dnepropetrovsk (SSR) would have corrected BUK-TELAR (PSR): ‘This might be a civil aircraft’, what of course was the task of BUK- TAR (RADAR).

    This means a solitary BUK-TELAR in a civil aviation area is inciting war crimes by conditional intent with probability consciousness (dolus eventualis).

    (Dolus eventualis refers to where a perpetrator foresees indirect consequences as a possibility. The legal definition of dolus eventualis is: Awareness of the likely outcome of an action.)]

    [A complication is a Russian BUK of the separatists which of course was not integrated within the Ukrainian system. Now Ukraine could object this is an invader and this is not their fault, not our responsibility. Then, legally, missing PSR in Donetsk has nothing to do with the assault on MH17].

    6.2.5

    PSR/SSR Data Combining

    Performance for PSR/SSR data combining shall be defined by:

    – Overall probability of association;
    – Overall false association rate.

    NOTES

    1. PSR/SSR data combining is the capability of the radar system to associate at each antenna scan the target reports of the same aircraft detected by the two sensors and to combine these reports into a single target report.(MH17 and II-76)

    2.The probability of association is determined by the ratio of the number of combined target reports in relation to the number of total expected combined reports, as defined by the measurement method.

    3.The association is defined as false, if the target reports from two unrelated targets detected by the two sensors have been associated.

    4.The false association rate is the number of combined target reports resulting from a false association in relation to the total number of combined target reports

    5. If this function is performed at the centre level, the same performance requirements apply.

    5.3.3.
    2. Reduced performance means that the performance of some element of the radar chain is below full performance. Depending on the circumstances, the provision of a radar service may or may not be affected.

    5.3.6. Warnings of significant failures within the radar chain, which may have an impact on flight safety and provision of air traffic services, shall be provided at the relevant control positions.

    5.3.8 Recommendation
    Scheduled maintenance should not exceed 24 hours over a period of 3 months.

  3. First of all, DSB did not report that Ukraine UkSATSE failed to report to Eurocontrol that at least one radar station was taken out of order.

    – “In accordance with the EUROCONTROL Radar Surveillance Standard, radar coverage required to support both terminal and en-route air traffic services must be:
    – double SSR coverage for en-route airspace;
    – double SSR coverage and single PSR cover for major terminal areas.”
    It looks like primary radar coverage was not required.
    If the primary radar was not required, what is the reason for you to claim that there was a Ukraine’s failure at all?

  4. ICAO Annex 11 however does not explicitly defines in what format radar should be recorded. It just states that radar data should be automatically recorded and retained for at least 30 days.
    – Russia is likely to have primary data. A well-known Russian news web-site probably accidentally published a sample. Look at the screenshot at http://www.mk.ru/incident/2014/11/12/dannye-aviadispetcherov-podtverdili-ryadom-s-boingom-rukhnuvshim-na-ukraine-letel-voennyy-samolet.html. It is very different from the info published by MoD http://stat.multimedia.mil.ru/multimedia/video/clips/more.htm?id=5086@morfVideoAudioFile. This implies that they have source, but do not disclose it.

Leave a comment

Your email address will not be published.


*